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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal realists emphasized the contradictory norms of law. Contra-
dictory norms permitted judges to reach conclusions about what basic
equities and broadly accepted social interests required in particular
cases. Judges then used whatever norm of law suited them to reason in
support of their a priori conclusions about what these equities or broad
social interests required.1
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has inherited and enhanced the legacy
of questioning the value of legal rules. CLS thinkers maintain that law
is indeterminate, drawing heavily upon linguists who have explored the
indeterminacy of language.' CLS scholars go beyond realists, however,
both in positing contradictory norms of law and law's indeterminacy,
and in stating their view of what has filled the subsequent void.
Nothing, however, has been thought to be as distant from legal re-
alism or the CLS movement as corporate law. At best CLS scholarship
has applied its dogma to commercial law.4 No less a jurist than William
0. Douglas 5 fancied himself a realist but in corporate law emerges as an
1. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); see also
W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 205-69 (1973).
2. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (B. Johnson trans. 1981); J. DERRIDA, OF GRAM-
MATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans. 1976).
3. See generally Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI.
L. RE V. 462, 463-84 (1987); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and
Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986); White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A
Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829 (1983);
Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373; Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982). See generally
Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).




A value of any jurisprudence, however, lies in how wide a variety of
phenomena the jurisprudence explains. Although realism and indeter-
minacy have yet to touch corporate law, these schools of jurisprudence
explain many basic phenomena in Delaware corporate law and, indeed,
do so very well. Furthermore, with the recent outpouring of case law
resulting from the takeover boom, Delaware law has become our na-
tional corporate law,7 and thus, indeterminacy describes the state of
corporate law generally.
Part II of this Article explores past explanations of Delaware cor-
porate jurisprudence, including revenue raising explanations such as
Professor Harry First's "Law for Sale,"8 and the late Professor William
Cary's "Race to the Bottom" thesis." Professor Daniel Fischel and other
economic analysis of law scholars also have espoused an efficiency en-
hancing, federalist theory of Delaware corporate law.'0 Most recently,
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have developed an in-
terest group explanation for Delaware's dominance in the corporate
field."
and Justice placed himself with Karl Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, and Thurman Arnold in the
realist camp.
6. Douglas urged a proshareholder, shirt sleeve capitalism in corporate-securities law deci-
sions, a majority of which he wrote during his years on the Court. His populist capitalism in turn
reflected distrust of aggregations of economic power or of those who might perceive themselves as
belonging to an economic elite. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
411 U.S. 582, 605, 610 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (advocating a broad reading of a provision
requiring corporate insiders to disgorge short term trading profits); Superintendent of Life Ins. of
New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (proposing a broad reading of a
federal securities law to reach acts of corporate mismanagement); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
311 (1939) (providing lofty dictum on the duty a corporate director owes the corporation, its share-
holders, and its creditors).
7. In 1965, 35% of the corporations with shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) were Delaware corporations. See G. SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 5 (1966). This
number had risen to 40% by 1973. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 671 & n.57 (1974). By 1987 the percentage had risen to 45%. See
Barrett, Delaware Moves Closer to Adopt Law to Deter Hostile Takeovers, Wall St. J., Dec. 9,
1987, at 41, col. 4; see also Geylein & Koenig, Pension Funds Plot Against Takeover Law, Wall St.
J., April 5, 1989, at C1, col. 5 (stating that 56% of Fortune 500 firms are incorporated in Dela-
ware). Of NYSE firms reincorporating between 1927-77, 90% had reincorporated in Delaware.
Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal
Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 263 (1980). Eighty-two percent of 515 publicly held corporations that
reincorporated since 1960 migrated to Delaware. See Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of
the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 225, 244 (1985).
8. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 861 (1969) (authored by Harry M. First).
9. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
10. See, e.g., Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop-
ments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982).
11. Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx.
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Part III articulates the indeterminacy thesis with respect to Dela-
ware corporation law by using two lines of cases to demonstrate that
Delaware courts have at their disposal tools of indeterminacy. These
tools enable those courts to decide many cases in whichever way they
prefer. Part IV then explores what has filled the void created by inde-
terminacy. This examination of the Delaware Supreme Court corporate
law decisions over a fourteen year period also lends circumstantial sup-
port to the indeterminacy thesis itself.
Part V concludes that Professors Macey and Miller basically are
correct in their assessment but fail to identify sufficiently all of the in-
terest groups involved. More importantly, the two scholars fail to un-
dertake a description of the ability and the actuality of how Delaware
courts are able to manipulate outcomes in order to serve the needs of
the key special interest groups that make up the Delaware corporate
establishment.
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR DELAWARE'S CORPORATE LAW DOMINANCE
A. Revenue Raising: Social Irresponsibility Theses
Drawing upon Cole Porter in a student comment entitled "Law for
Sale, '12 now Professor Harry First initially described Delaware's domi-
nance in attracting incorporations to its doors. He credited the
promanagement content of Delaware's 1967 revision of its corporate law
with attracting incorporation business.13 In turn, incorporation business
brought to Delaware's treasury twenty-five percent of its revenues in
1968.14
Other scholars have denigrated Delaware for the state's attraction
of incorporation business. In 1974 Professor William Cary illustrated in
tabular form the revolving door movement between the Delaware judi-
ciary and the Delaware corporate law firms. 5 He excoriated "the pre-
sent predicament in which a pygmy among the 50 states prescribes,
interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an incen-
tive tc encourage incorporation within its borders, thereby increasing
its revenue."1 " He emphasized the revenue raising aspects of adopting
promanagement rules in Delaware, and argued that these aspects over-
L. REV. 469 (1987).
12. Compare Porter, "Love for Sale" (1930) with Comment, supra note 8. Professor First
currently teaches law at New York University.
13. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 874-87 (describing the evolution of rules for indem-
nification of corporate officers and directors).
14. Id. at 863. Today the proportion from franchise taxes is 16.9%. Romano, supra note 7, at
240.
15. Cary, supra note 9, at 690-92.
16. Id. at 701.
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rode any other kind of public policy consideration."7 Professor Cary
compared Delaware's attempt to attract incorporations to "a commu-
nity chest drive."18 As a palliative for the situation, Professor Cary pro-
posed federal minimum corporate law standards that would displace
promanagement state law rules in a number of corporate law areas. 9
Professor Cary's proposals competed with another reform proposal,
federal chartering of publicly held corporations, championed by Ralph
Nader and his Corporate Accountability Research Group. Federal char-
tering also used Delaware's promanagement rules as an example of cor-
porate law's deplorable state.2 0 Its constructive prescription was that
large corporations be required to reincorporate under and be governed
altogether by federal law. Together Cary's and Nader's proposals con-
stituted the high water mark of the corporate social responsibility re-
form movement of the 1970s.
B. Corporate Federalist: Economic Efficiency Explanation
About this time a new jurisprudence, economic analysis of law,
emerged. Several of its practitioners applied it to explain Delaware's
corporate law dominance. By adopting promanagement rules, Delaware
was engaged in a competition among states for incorporation business.
That competition produced efficient corporate law rules. The corporate
management flexibility thereby engendered could benefit shareholders
by increasing the total wealth, managers' and shareholders'2 included.
This healthy competition for charters explained much about Delaware's
corporate law dominance.
According to this corporate federalist view, the majority of rules
that a corporate statutory scheme retains do no more than approximate
the agreement the parties to a venture would have negotiated for regu-
lating their affairs, absent transaction costs. The corporate federalists
held that as corporate law evolved its principal function was to provide
a low-cost, off-the-rack set of rules. As a corollary, if the parties chose
17. See id. at 684 (stating that "[p]erhaps there is no public policy left in Delaware corporate
law except the objective of raising revenue"); see also- Comment, supra note 8, at 869 (noting that
"[tlhe legislature did have one concern (besides tax revenues)-jobs"); id. at 870 (noting that "Del-
aware measures its concern with corporation law in terms of tax revenues . . ").
18. Id. at 668 (opining that "the raison d'etre behind the whole system. . . [is] revenue for
the state of Delaware").
19. Id. at 696-705.
20. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE
CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 51-76 (1976). "Delaware-Opera
Bouffe. What began as tragedy in New Jersey was institutionalized as farce in Delaware." Id. at 51.
21. See generally R. POSNER & K ScoTr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SEcuRITIEs
REGULATION (1980); R WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 7-11 (1978); Baysinger & But-
ler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law,
10 J. CORP. L. 431 (1985); Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 7; Fischel, supra note 10.
1990]
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to pay the transaction costs, they should be free to opt out of the stan-
dard form contract by negotiating for and memorializing alternative
rules or arrangements. Thus, the federalist school's vision of corporate
law has promanagement rules not directly, but indirectly, as the prod-
uct of supremacy of contract and the superior bargaining power corpo-
rate managements would possess. The federalist school holds that
market forces and contract, not hard and fast legal rules, increasingly
govern corporate managers. Delaware consistently has taken the lead in
making such a vision of corporate law a reality and thereby retains its
dominance in the corporate field.22
Practitioners of this federalist school also have attacked the classi-
cal liberal, interventionist positions taken by a Ralph Nader or a Wil-
liam Cary. Some of these criticisms have been particularly bold. As one
such practitioner confidently states, "Cary's position has been discred-
ited; indeed, in recent years it has been discussed only as an illustration
of how it is possible to reach the wrong conclusions if one lacks a basic
understanding of the economic structure of the corporation and of cor-
porate law."2
C. An Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law
The theory that best explains Delaware's corporate law environ-
ment is the interest group analysis of Professors Macey and Miller.2'
According to this theory, Delaware's legislature and judiciary do not
just adopt, depending upon the points of view just seen, promanage-
ment or efficiency enhancing sets of rules. That activity takes place but
is only part of a larger equation.
Adoption of those sorts of rules serves well the Delaware state trea-
sury and the corporation trust companies that operate in Delaware for
the benefit of Delaware corporations headquartered back home in Indi-
ana, California, or Maine. This adoption of promanagement, or effi-
ciency enhancing, rules also serves well the managements and
hometown counsel of those corporations incorporated in Delaware. At a
minimum, those latter groups enjoy the predictability that Delaware's
rich corporate jurisprudence creates and the flexibility that Delaware's
statutes and cases give them. Moreover, many managers and their legal
advisors believe that Delaware will make it difficult for shareholders
22. See, e.g., Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts To Curtail the Fiduciary
Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 375-78, 380-82
(1988).
23. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 1437,
1454 (1985) (footnote omitted).
24. Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 485-91.
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and their attorneys to disrupt corporate managers' designs. "5
The other portion of the equation, and the other significant inter-
est group in the Delaware environment, is the Delaware corporate bar.
This group does not earn its livelihood from the incorporation business
that has so benefited Delaware's treasury and the corporation service
companies over the years. The Delaware corporate bar seldom repre-
sents corporations generally. Instead, the bar earns fees by interpreting
and advising on questions of Delaware law, by acting as local counsel in
corporate litigation, and most often by acting as lead counsel in the
never ending flow of lawsuits to Delaware Chancery Court and appeals
to the Delaware Supreme Court.2" In a way, these latter interests of the
bar are antithetical to the interests of corporate managers and of the
state treasury. Corporate managers and the Delaware treasury desire
predictability, tranquility, and the incorporation business that results.
In another way, however, the Delaware corporate bar and the other
interest groups' interests complement each other. Litigation and the
flow of chancery and supreme court opinions thereby produced actually
generate the predictability hometown counsel and their corporate man-
ager clients desire.
The Delaware corporate bar interest group analysis largely explains
why Delaware has, and must have, a plaintiffs' side which eliminates
many procedural hurdles so that plaintiffs will sue there. Delaware
makes suit in Delaware the obvious choice among possible fora. Dela-
ware's director consent statute deems all directors to have consented to
substituted service of process upon the corporation's registered agent in
Delaware or the Delaware Secretary of State.28 Unlike many other
states, Delaware has no security-for-costs provision that gives potential
plaintiffs pause in filing derivative litigation. 9 Delaware courts gener-
25. The overwhelming majority of decisions to reincorporate in Delaware are made by legal
counsel. See Romano, supra note 7, at 274 table 12.
26. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 494-96.
27. See id. at 496-97. Professor Cary also summarized many of these procedural advantages
for Delaware plaintiffs, but he did not fit them neatly into his analysis. See Cary, supra note 9, at
686-88.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. X, § 3114(a) (Supp. 1988). Earlier in its history Delaware deemed the
situs of every share of stock in a Delaware corporation to be Delaware, thus making it possible for
plaintiffs to gain quasi in rem jurisdiction over most of the actors in corporation transactions to be
litigated. The Supreme Court declared this Delaware sequestration procedure unconstitutional in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). With characteristic responsiveness, the Delaware legisla-
ture enacted the consent procedure within a matter of days after the decision in Shaffer. Soon
thereafter the Delaware Supreme Court held the new procedure constitutional. See Armstrong v.
Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980).
29. See, e.g., ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §




ously approve settlements that reward plaintiffs' attorneys with hand-
some fees.30 Even though the substantive rules are promanagement or
efficiency enhancing, most of the procedural incidents"1 are conducive
to plaintiffs suing in Delaware, as the special interest group theory of
Delaware corporate law would predict.
III. THE INDETERMINACY THESIS
The foregoing explanations of Delaware's dominance in the corpo-
rate law area discuss Delaware's rules. They are promanagement rules,
or efficiency enhancing rules, or compromise rules serving interest
groups whose objectives are not always compatible. But what if there
are no rules? Or what if the number of norms or rules from which to
choose is so great that Delaware corporate law, or large portions of it,
can be said to be indeterminate?
A. The Demise of Vested Rights Doctrines
A thorough understanding of how indeterminacy developed in cor-
porate law requires a cursory historical survey. Not long ago fundamen-
tal shareholder rights were considered vested rights. These fundamental
rights included the right to cumulate votes in the election of directors,
the preemptive right to subscribe to new share issuances in proportion
to shares already owned, and the preferred shareholder's right to pay-
ment of dividend arrearages before any dividends could be paid to the
common shareholders. These rights were so fundamental that even a
supermajority of shares could not amend articles of incorporation to re-
move them.2 A definitive boundary existed beyond which majority rule
could not go.
From 1940 onward, courts in various jurisdictions eliminated
vested rights doctrines. The majority of shares could vote to eliminate a
preemptive right or a right to cumulative voting for directors.3 Elimi-
30. See, e.g., Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1990) (stating that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court refuses to limit itself to the prevailing lodestar approach based upon hours
expended and that this approach often may result in fees significantly lower than the value of the
benefit conferred on the corporation formula).
31. Compare Beals v. Washington Intern, Inc., 386 A.2d 1156, 1158-59 (Del. Ch. 1978) (disal-
lowing punitive damages against officials of Delaware corporations) with Giblin v. Murphy, 97
A.D.2d 668, 671, 469 N.Y.S.2d 211, 215 (1983) (stating that punitive damages against corporate
directors are permitted in cases of gross mismanagement).
32. See, e.g., Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del Ch. 391, 412, 190 A. 115, 125 (1936) (invalidating
a charter amendment cancelling dividend arrearages on the ground that arrearages represented a
"vested right of property secured.. . by the Federal and State Constitutions").
33. See, e.g., Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin, 271 Ala. 414, 426-27, 124 So. 2d 812,
823-24 (1960) (preemptive right no longer a vested right); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del.
Ch. 82, 95, 90 A.2d 660, 667 (1952) (preemptive right no longer a vested right); Morales v. Seva-
nanda, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 854, 856, 293 S.E.2d 387, 389 (1982) (holding that members of not-for-
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nation did not strip an objecting shareholder minority of all protection.
Courts held that elimination of basic rights was subject to a fairness
analysis. s The objecting minority, however, was deprived of the sure-
fire objection to majority action that vested rights doctrines historically
had represented. 5
Elimination of vested rights gave rise to a commonly observed phe-
nomenon in corporate law that forms a root of indeterminacy. In corpo-
rate law what one cannot do directly one can do indirectly. What
cannot be accomplished in one step may be accomplished in three or
four. Form routinely is exalted over substance.
A number of transactions have developed which exemplify this pro-
position that what one cannot do directly one can do indirectly. For
example, a shareholder majority or their representatives on the board of
directors cannot issue shares in violation of other shareholders' preemp-
tive rights.s Yet indirectly they can. The majority can call a sharehold-
ers' meeting, vote to amend articles of incorporation to eliminate
preemptive rights, and then issue shares to third parties that formerly
would have violated the preemptive rights doctrine. Additionally, pay-
ment of certain dividends, repurchase of shares, elimination of pre-
ferred stock arrearages, or negation of cumulative voting rights cannot
be accomplished directly. All these things can be accomplished indi-
rectly, however, through muster of the requisite shareholder vote, an
ensuing amendment of the articles of incorporation and a resulting re-
casting of financial statements, or through recapitalization or corporate
profit corporation "had no vested right in any provision of the original articles of incorporation");
Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 105 R.I. 36, 43-44, 249 A.2d 89, 94 (1969) (no
vested right in dividend arrearages on preferred shares); Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. McCarthy,
94 Wash. 2d 605, 611, 617 P.2d 1023, 1027-28 (1980) (preemptive right not a vested right) rev'g
State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wash. 2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948) (holding methods of voting
to be vested rights in Washington corporations).
34. See generally Halloran, Equitable Limitations on the Power to Amend Articles of Incor-
poration, 4 PAc. L.J. 47 (1973); Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage
Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. 1 (1942).
35. Minority shareholders may argue that provisions in the articles of incorporation are con-
tractual protections for which they specifically bargained. Such a quasi-vested rights approach is
sometimes successful. See, e.g., Horowitz Bros. & Margareten v. Margareten, 101 A.D.2d 807, 475
N.Y.S.2d 134 (1984) (articles of incorporation reformed to include 1910 agreement that no material
alteration could be made in the corporation's business over the objection of any owner); Jacobson
v. Backman, 16 Utah 2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965) (charter provision for removal of directors only
by two-thirds vote was quasi-vested right unaffected by later amendment of corporate statute or
subsequent majority shareholder vote). Sometimes the arguments do not succeed. See, e.g., McCal-
lum v. Gray, 273 Or. 617, 618, 542 P.2d 1025, 1026 (1975) (preincorporation agreement providing
for filing of articles as attached held insufficient to protect preemptive rights from subsequent
charter amendment).
36. The preemptive right is defined as a shareholder's right "to purchase a percentage of the
new issue that equals his or her percentage of ownership of the already outstanding stock (of the
same class) of the corporation." R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.1.4, at 719 (1986).
1990]
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reorganization. This phenomenon, that what cannot be accomplished
directly may be accomplished indirectly, exists throughout corporate
law. The phenomenon is not limited to Delaware, but Delaware has
raised it to an art form. 7
B. On the One Hand: The Delaware Equal Dignity Rule
Time and time again Delaware courts have permitted shareholder
majorities to accomplish indirectly what those majorities could not ac-
complish directly. Moving beyond even art, Delaware has raised this
phenomenon of corporate manipulation to the level of doctrine and
christened it with a name: The equal dignity rule.
The Delaware equal dignity rule may find its best expression in the
de facto merger cases.38 In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.39 List Corpora-
tion desired to achieve two objectives in its acquisition of Glen Alden, a
Pennsylvania corporation. First, List wanted Glen Alden to be the sur-
viving corporation in order to preserve and utilize Glen Alden's tax loss
carryforward against List's profits. The second objective was preserva-
tion of List's store of cash. If Glen Alden shareholders had a right to
dissent and receive cash for their shares, a number of them might have
done so. A number of dissents would have depleted List's cash hoard.
Counsel, therefore, structured the transaction as stock for assets rather
than stock for stock and as a reverse transaction. 0 Technically, Glen
Alden would be issuing stock to List shareholders and List would be
selling assets. In reality, though, the reverse was true.41 Under Pennsyl-
vania statutory law then in effect, shareholders of a corporation buying
assets had no right to dissent and receive cash for the appraised value
of their shares.42 In a statutory merger they would have had such a
right.
37. Indeed, this elevation may be the result of legislative enactment as well as judicial deci-
sion. For example, although a statute may forbid a board of directors from acting unless a quorum
is present at a meeting, the quorum requirement can be evaded easily by delegation to a commit-
tee of the board. Modern statutes place few restrictions upon such delegation. Compare REVISED
MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 8.24 (1985) (quorum requirements) with id. § 8.25 (few restrictions
on delegations to committees).
38. An early equal dignity rule case was Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318,
11 A.2d 331 (1940) (holding that even though preferred stock dividend arrearages could not be
eliminated by charter amendment they could be eliminated by merger with another corporation).
The power to merge is different from the power to recapitalize, and "is plain, understandable and
general" and is "not qualified or restricted by limitation or exception." Id. at 330-31, 11 A.2d at
337.
39. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
40. Id. at 438, 143 A.2d at 31.
41. After the transaction, Glen Alden was renamed List Alden Corporation. See id. at 429,
143 A.2d at 27.
42. Id. at 436-37, 143 A.2d at 30-31.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the structure of the
transaction between Glen Alden and List was functionally equivalent to
a merger. Holding that substance must prevail over form, the court
ruled the sale of assets to be a de facto merger.43 Dissenting sharehold-
ers therefore would be entitled to cash for their shares, as in cases of
statutory merger.4
The Delaware courts reached the opposite result four years later in
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.45 The Delaware statutes contained
procedures for merger of two corporations.4" Those procedures created
for target company shareholders the right to dissent and seek appraisal
and cash for their shares in the Delaware courts. The statutes also con-
tained procedures for a corporation to sell all or substantially all of its
assets to another corporation in return for stock or cash.47 Those proce-
dures did not include a right of shareholders to dissent and seek
appraisal.
The Delaware Vice Chancellor held that the two statutory path-
ways were independent of each other so that a result may be accom-
plished by proceeding on a course of action under one section which is
not possible, or even forbidden, under another.48 The courts refrained
from saying which of two or more inconsistent procedures was superior
to another. That task was for the legislature.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that the sale-of-assets stat-
ute and the merger statute were, and are, independent of one another.
They are, so to speak, of equal dignity.49 The result of decisions like
Hariton is that no matter how circuitous a path might be, if in the Del-
aware statute a corporate lawyer can find a track to his objective, that
path or track is of equal dignity with a more direct path, even though
the circuitous track has fewer or no shareholder protections. Two or
more paths to the same objective are of equal dignity.8
43. Id. at 438, 143 A.2d at 31.
44. An interesting sequel is that List shareholders sued List directors, alleging that expendi-
ture of corporate funds, principally for attorneys fees, for purposes of exploring the feasibility and
then in attempting consummation of the transaction was a waste of corporate assets. See Gilbert v.
Burnside, 13 A.D.2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961) (denying any recovery), af'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183
N.E.2d 325, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1962).
45. 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (1962), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963).
46. See Del. Code Ann. tit. VIII, § 251 (1983).
47. See id. § 271.
48. Horiton, 40 Del. Ch. at 333, 182 A.2d at 26.
49. Hariton, 41 Del. Ch. at 76, 188 A.2d at 125.
50. See, e.g., Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984) (allowing
the use of a merger to undercut preferred share preference on liquidation when the same could not
be done in liquidation-merger and liquidation pathways held to be of equal dignity); Field v.
Allyn, 457 A.2d 1089 (Del. Ch.), af'd, 467 A.2d 1274 (Del. 1983) (holding that statutory provisions
for a cash-out merger without a shareholders' meeting and for a sale of assets only after a share-
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The equal dignity rule emerged as a green light, signaling the Dela-
ware courts' readiness to approve corporate transactions. For the corpo-
rate practitioner, the equal dignity rule signals that where there is a will
there is a way. And, of course, the Delaware equal dignity rule is not a
rule; it is a "non-rule" that permits a corporate lawyer to choose from,
and a judge to validate a choice from, seemingly contradictory pathways
or norms.
C. On the Other Hand: The Schnell Case and Its Progeny
In 1971 the incumbent managers of Chris-Craft Industries learned
that an insurgent shareholder group planned to wage a proxy fight to
attempt election of the insurgents' own slate of directors.51 Chris-Craft
managers and lawyers huddled, finding that nothing in Delaware law or
in Chris-Craft's bylaws prevented advancement of the date for the an-
nual shareholders' meeting. If Chris-Craft advanced the meeting date,
the insurgents would not have time to prepare, let alone disseminate,
proxy solicitation materials. Chris-Craft advanced the date for the
meeting from January 11, 1972, to December 8, 1971, and, as an added
fillip, changed the meeting's location to Cortland, New York, where
Chris-Craft had a manufacturing facility. Travel to Cortland in Decem-
ber snows was likely to be difficult.
On the insurgent shareholders' motion for preliminary injunction,
the Delaware Chancery Court held that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that the corporation's board of directors advanced the date of
its annual meeting.52 Eleven days later the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed, holding the incumbent Chris-Craft manager's activity to be
for "inequitable purposes" and "contrary to established principles of
corporate democracy."53 To Chris-Craft's rejoinder that neither the
statute nor bylaws prevented the managers' actions, the court replied
that "inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it
is legally possible.
'5 4
With Schnell the Delaware Supreme Court created the antipode of
the equal dignity rule. The equal dignity "non-rule" rule permitted use
of a circuitous statutory path to evade a shareholder protection or re-
holders' meeting are of equal dignity); see also Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir.
1988) (pathways of cash merger and for payment of liquidation preferences upon redemption or
liquidation are of equal dignity; preferred shareholders must accept $40 offered rather than $100
provided for in articles of incorporation).
51. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 430, 431-32 (Del. Ch.), rev'd, 285 A.2d 437 (Del.
1971).
52. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 430.




quirement of a more direct route. Under Schnell, however, inequitable
action cannot become permissible merely because it is legally possible.
Thus, as long ago as 1971, the Delaware courts had tools of indetermi-
nacy at their disposal.
1. Restricting the Schnell Doctrine to Election Cases
For many years, however, Delaware courts confined application of
the Schnell doctrine to disputes involving the election of corporate di-
rectors. In election cases that involve no violation of a statutory direc-
tive but nonetheless offend the court's notion of fair play, a Delaware
court might invoke the doctrine.
For example, in Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,55 Diagnostic's di-
rectors had the power to amend the corporation's bylaws. They used
that power to change a fixed annual meeting date to one set at their
discretion. The incumbent directors also added a new bylaw requiring
any candidate for director, excluding management's nominees, to sub-
mit background information not less than seventy days prior to the
meeting. Each action itself was permissible. Then, three months later
the incumbent board set th6 date of the shareholders' meeting sixty-
three days from the date of the board meeting, making it impossible for
the plaintiff to comply with the seventy day background information
bylaw. 6 Vice Chancellor Brown, however, struck down the new bylaws
not merely as applied but on their face. In combination, the bylaws
were held to require any challengers to be "shelf-ready" with proxy
materials "whenever management decides to drop the flag" by exercis-
ing its authority to set the annual meeting date.57 The incumbent Diag-
nostic board's actions constituted the type of impermissible
manipulation of the corporate election machinery that the Schnell doc-
trine condemns.58
2. Reluctance to Expand Schnell's Application
Tender offers in which shareholders are asked to displace incum-
bent managers by tendering shares to the "insurgents" are analogous to
election contests in which shareholders are asked to tender votes.
Tender offer defenses can be viewed as attempts by managers to thwart
55. 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980).
56. Id. at 909-11.
57. Id. at 914.
58. Other cases have described the doctrine as one that prohibits perpetuation of corporate
control through "wrongful subversion of corporate democracy . . . by machinations under the
cloak of Delaware law." Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (perpetuation of




the electoral process and perpetuate their control. Thus, the tender of-
fer area seems to be a logical area for expanding application of the
Schnell doctrine.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.59 a target company board
of directors decided to pay reverse greenmail rather than greenmail.
That is, instead of purchasing the threatening shareholder's shares at a
premium over the market, the corporation proposed to purchase a sub-
stantial block of shares from all shareholders other than the threatening
shareholder. As a result, the corporation's treasury would be depleted
and its capital structure burdened with debt, making it a less attractive
takeover target. At the same time, however, the shareholders would be
deprived of an opportunity to vote on the tender offer. The Delaware
Supreme Court gave recognition to the Schnell doctrine, observing that
"[o]f course,. . . the further caveat [is] that inequitable action may not
be taken under the guise of law."60 But Schnell did not apply because
the court found that Unocal's directors had not acted out of a sole or
primary desire to perpetuate themselves in office."
The Schnell doctrine has been applied in a handful of situations
other than election cases. In Singer v. Magnavox Co.62 the majority
shareholder proposed to use a cash merger to squeeze out the minority
shareholders who remained. The Delaware Supreme Court used the
Schnell doctrine to impose upon the majority shareholder a business
purpose requirement for such mergers.6 3 Although the letter of Dela-
ware law permits such mergers, the court could enjoin them if inequita-
ble. The Singer court stated that a merger conducted solely to freeze
59. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
60. Id. at 955.
61. Id. at 958. Even in the election area the Delaware courts may balk at application of the
doctrine. In Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975), incumbent man-
agers seized control through buying preferred shares upon which no dividends were paid for some
time. The preferred shares had a feature common to such issues. The preferred could elect a ma-
jority of the directors if preferred stock dividends were more than six quarters in arrears. Then,
despite a steadily improving financial picture, the incumbents kept the preferred in default and,
consequently, themselves in control of the corporation. Id. at 655-57. The Court made passing note
of the Schnell doctrine: "Plaintiff has cited a wealth of authorities standing for various accepted
propositions of corporate law, the most prominent of which hold that incumbent directors cannot
... manipulate corporate machinery so as to maintain or perpetuate control in a particular group
of stockholders." Id. at 657. The court refused to apply the doctrine, however, unless plaintiff
presented a case applying the doctrine on all fours with the case at bar. See id. at 657 (stating that
plaintiff "offers no authorities which apply this prohibition to a factual situation such as the pre-
sent one").
If ever there was a case to apply the Schnell doctrine, Baron would seem to be it. The case
involved election of directors, manipulation of corporate machinery relating to it, and perpetuation
by the directors of themselves in control. Thus, it sometimes becomes difficult to predict when
Delaware courts will apply the doctrine.
62. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
63. Id. at 979-80.
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out minority stockholders is "an abuse of the corporate process."64 Al-
though the Delaware Supreme Court later repudiated its business pur-
pose requirement,6 5 the use of the Schnell doctrine in Singer increased
unpredictability about when the Delaware courts would invoke the doc-
trine and doubt as to its confinement to the corporate elections area.es
3. The Latest Extension of the Schnell Doctrine
Through gradual extensions the Schnell doctrine has become an
all-purpose, corporate law doctrine. Along with Singer, Rabkin v. Philip
A. Hunt Chemical Corp.7 illustrates this proposition. Rabkin involves
neither election of directors nor any other vote by shareholders.
In March 1983 Olin Corporation acquired sixty-three percent of
Hunt Chemical, paying twenty-five dollars per share. The selling Hunt
shareholders, however, sought to protect the minority left behind. Their
agreement of sale required Olin also to pay twenty-five dollars per share
if Olin acquired the remaining Hunt stock within one year. Fifteen
months later, in June 1984, Olin proposed to squeeze out the remaining
Hunt shareholders but offered them only twenty dollars per share. 8
In court Olin argued that it had not breached its contractual com-
mitment. The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed, scoffing at Olin's
contention it had no legal obligation to effect the cash-out merger
within a year and supporting a claim of unfair dealing. The court reiter-
ated the Schnell principle that inequitable conduct will not be pro-
tected merely because it is legal.6 9
64. Id. at 980.
65. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
66. An older, borderline elections area invocation of the Schnell doctrine is Petty v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975). Delaware law had long prohibited use of
corporate funds to purchase shares to maintain management in control. See, e.g., Bennett v.
Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962); Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941). But see Cheff V.
Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). In Penntech Papers, however, the articles of incorporation
clearly provided that management could redeem any or all of 26,000 preferred shares that carried
ten votes per share. The two managers proposed to redeem all of the preferred except the 7000
shares they owned. Together with their common stock, ex post they would have 53% of the voting
power and control a majority of the directors. 347 A.2d at 141.
The court enjoined the preferred stock redemption, although its connection with the electoral
process arguably was less direct than advancement of meetings dates and other topics with which
the Schnell doctrine traditionally deals. Despite the clear language in the articles of incorporation
permitting selective redemption of the preferred stock, the chancellor held that a "charter or by-
law provisions may technically permit the action contemplated does not automatically insulate
directors against scrutiny of purpose." Id. at 143 (citing Schnell). The court proceeded to find the
impermissible purpose of perpetuation in office. Id.
67. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
68. Id. at 1101-03.
69. Id. at 1106-07. Specifically the court stated:
In our opinion the facts alleged by the plaintiffs regarding Olin's avoidance of the one
year commitment support a claim of unfair dealing. . . .The defendants answer that they
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Rabkin indicates that the Delaware courts need no longer confine
application of the Schnell doctrine to cases involving election of direc-
tors, corporate elections generally, or attempts by managers to perpetu-
ate themselves in office. Schnell has become a kind of universal solvent
for courts and plaintiffs. Just as courts and defendants can use the
"non-rule" equal dignity rule to facilitate transactions, courts and
plaintiffs can use the Schnell doctrine to derail them. Through Rabkin
and other cases, Schnell becomes a red light, signaling the Delaware
courts' ability to block transactions and to accept plaintiffs' arguments,
at least some of the time, in all categories of corporate law cases.
IV. IN THE WAKE OF INDETERMINACY
A. Scope of Study
Although useful for practitioners and litigants, demonstration that
the Delaware courts have the tools of indeterminacy at their disposal is
not determinative. Availability of these seemingly all purpose legal doc-
trines and their application in a variety of settings is but circumstantial
evidence of indeterminacy in Delaware corporate law.
As a search for further circumstantial evidence of indeterminacy,
and also to determine what has filled the void indeterminacy leaves in
its wake, I examined Delaware Supreme Court decisions from a four-
teen year period. As a beginning point, I selected 1974, the year of Wil-
liam Cary's "Race to the Bottom" article.7° The study then was
conducted through 1987.7
1
B. Methodology and Research Design
The area of study was shareholder litigation in which shareholder
interests opposed the interests of corporate management. In a few Dela-
ware Supreme Court corporate law cases shareholders opposed share-
holders. 2 Those cases were deleted from the sample.
In numerous other instances a corporation represented the share-
holder interest.7 '3 Indeed, in several cases a large publicly held corpora-
had no legal obligation to effect the cash-out merger during the one year period. While this
may be so, the principle announced in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries establishes that ineq-
uitable conduct will not be protected merely because it is legal.
Id. (citations omitted).
70. Cary, supra note 9; see also supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
71. The results of the study are quantified in tabular form in the Tables to the Appendix.
72. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Tarpey, 419 A.2d 932 (Del. 1980) (collection action by selling share-
holder against shareholder who had purchased the shares).
73. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (suit by corpo-
rate shareholder to enjoin payment of reverse greenmail); Monogram Indus. v. Royal Indus., 372
A.2d 171 (Del. 1976) (takeover target's suit alleging corporate shareholder's noncompliance with
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tion represented the shareholder interest. 4 Hence, several cases in
which large corporations squared off against large corporations were
nonetheless instances of shareholder litigation. Those cases were not
deleted from the sample.
In several cases, the shareholder or shareholder interest lies with
the defense. In takeover litigation, for example, the target corporation
frequently sues the acquiror of shares. In those cases the shareholder
interest usually lies with the defendant acquiror of shares.7 Thus, a
study of shareholder litigation cannot be simply a study of when plain-
tiffs win or lose. The study must determine on which side the share-
holder interest lies. Those cases in which the shareholder interest was
determined to be on the defense side are marked with an "R," for re-
alignment, in the column headed "Prevailing Side." The R cases num-
ber seven in the sixty-six case sample.
76
1. Characterizations
Characterization of a particular side as representing the share-
holder interest may be a subjective determination in a few cases. For
example, several Delaware Supreme Court cases involve tender offerors
as defendants.7 7 In those cases, the defense side was characterized as
representing the shareholder interest. Most corporate managers and
some legal commentators would disagree. These critics would state that
corporate managers rather than tender offerors typically have long term
shareholder interests closer to heart. 8
Characterizing winners and losers in these cases also may be a sub-
jective matter. For example, Delaware cases signal judicial willingness
to approve fee awards to shareholders' attorneys.7 9 Generous fee awards
Delaware takeover law).
74. See, e.g., Coaxial Communications v. CNA Fin. Corp., 367 A.2d 994 (Del. 1976) (as share-
holder plaintiff CNA sought an order compelling corporate management to conduct an annual
shareholders' meeting); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 334 A.2d 216 (Del.
1975) (appeal of appraisal proceeding with large corporation as the dissenting shareholder).
75. See, e.g., GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980); Monogram In-
dus., 372 A.2d at 171.
76. See app. Table A, col. F. That is, one way to approach the study would have been as a
study of when plaintiffs win in Delaware corporate litigation, with the parties realigned in those
cases in which the shareholder interest exists on the defense side.
77. See, e.g., GM Sub Corp., 415 A.2d at 473; Monogram Indus., 372 A.2d at 171.
78. See, e.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. RE V. 1 (1987).
79. There are at least 11 such cases in the sample. See, e.g., Lipton v. News Int'l, 514 A.2d
1075 (Del. 1986) (allowance of unapproved settlement in shareholder litigation by characterizing
claims as individual rather than derivative); Selfe v. Joseph, 501 A.2d 409 (Del. 1985) (refusal to
modify settlement in squeeze out merger case); Wied v. Valhi, Inc., 466 A.2d 9 (Del. 1983) (refusal
to interfere in class representative's settlement and post-settlement activity), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1026 (1984); Geller v. Tabas, 462 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1983) (approval of derivative and class
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encourage shareholder litigation and possible vindication of shareholder
interests. Overly generous fee awards and excessive litigation, however,
unduly burden corporate treasuries and are inimical to longer term
shareholder interests.80 Characterizing the shareholder interest as lying
with those who seek approval of a fee in what may be a cosmetic settle-
ment, or characterizing the shareholder side as the winner, may be
problematic. These reservations notwithstanding, cases in which the
Delaware Supreme Court approves settlements and attorney fee awards
have been characterized as cases in which the shareholder interest has
prevailed.8 '
Finally, the study sorts the Delaware shareholder litigation cases as
either procedural or substantive corporate cases. Procedural cases prin-
cipally involve approval of either attorney fee awards or derivative and
class action settlements.8 2 More broadly, procedural cases involve pre-
liminary matters arising in the early stages of a lawsuit. These cases
usually have a measurable impact upon whether suit will be brought in
Delaware."5
settlements); Thomas v. Sugarland Indus., 431 A.2d 1271 (Del. 1981) (approval of application of
attorney fee award formula developed earlier); Fins v. Pearlman, 424 A.2d 305 (Del. 1980) (settle-
ment of class action approved); Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980) (adoption of
value of benefit conferred rather than strictly hourly lodestar formula for computation of share-
holder attorney fee awards); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876 (Del. 1980) (attor-
ney fee award upheld); Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97 (Del. 1979) (settlement with
preferred shareholders upheld over common shareholders' objections); Wood v. Coastal States Gas
Corp., 401 A.2d 932 (Del. 1979) (settlement with common shareholders upheld over preferred
shareholders' objections); Iroquois Indus. v. Lewis, 318 A.2d 134 (Del. 1974) (attorney fee award
upheld). In Delaware no objector has been able to derail a settlement or attorney fee award at the
supreme court level, although the plaintiff in Sugarland Indus., 420 A.2d at 150, enjoyed mixed
success.
80. See generally Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Share-
holder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985).
81. It was difficult to pinpoint a clear winner or loser in two cases, possibly because the court
gave something to each party. The cases are Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1977)
(determination that while one class of Shanghai Power Co. securities did not have value another
class did), and Harff v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133 (1975) (preferred shareholders held to lack stand-
ing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty but allowed to proceed on claim of common law fraud).
82. Eleven of the eighteen cases classified as procedural fall into that category. See supra
note 79.
83. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984) (forced seller of shares held to be
without standing to bring derivative suit); Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del.
1982) (duty of majority to minority shareholder held within chancellor's subject matter jurisdic-
tion); Doffiemeyer v. W. F. Hall Printing Co., 432 A.2d 1198 (Del. 1981) (dissenters' rights proce-
dure strictly construed); Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980) (director presumed
consent statute held constitutional); Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976) (Dela-
ware share sequestration procedure upheld as constitutional), rev'd sub nom. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977); Walter Reade Org., Inc. v. Crane, 332 A.2d 399 (Del. 1975) (refusal of corpo-
rate request to stay Delaware proceeding because action also pending in New York); Gimbel v.
Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (upholding chancellor's requirement of $25 million bond
before preliminary injunction would issue to prevent sale of subsidiary's shares to another oil
INDETERMINACY
Other cases that appear to be procedural in nature remain in the
substantive category. Examples of such cases include those involving
use of the special litigation committee device in derivative litigation, or
when a plaintiff shareholder's demand on the board of directors will be
excused as futile. General corporation law historically treats these inci-
dents of the derivative action as substantive, in large part because they
are matters of corporate governance. 4 Hence, the standards of what is
procedural for purposes of sorting out the Delaware corporate cases
may seem to be drawn somewhat narrowly.
2. End Product
Table A names in chronological order sixty-six Delaware Supreme
Court opinions in shareholder litigation decided in the years 1974 to
1987, inclusive. Columns A-C contain objective items of information:
case name, citation, and date of opinion release. Columns D-F contain
the product of more subjective judgments. Column D is a short charac-
terization of the principal issue in the case. Column E indicates whether
the case involves procedural (P) or substantive (S) corporate law issues.
Column F sets out the sometimes doubly subjective view of which side
is which, shareholder or management, and, between those sides, which
prevailed.
Finally, column G is headed "Roadmap." In corporate law cases,
the Delaware Supreme Court seems to regard itself as an oracle, and
justly so. More than any other institution, save perhaps the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Delaware courts are the propounders of
national corporate law. Probably due to awareness of that role, in its
opinions the Delaware Supreme Court often expatiates at length along
preventive law lines. It indicates specifically what intracorporate proce-
dure or procedures might aid others in avoiding the predicament in
which the litigants at bar find themselves. When the court has rendered
that kind of guidance for posterity, a "Yes" has been placed in column
G.
Table B is an annual display of the total number of Delaware Su-
preme Court corporate law decisions. It also indicates the number and
percentage of those that represent wins by shareholder interests.
company).
84. Thus, the law of the state of incorporation rather than of the forum state will control.
See generally Branson, The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and the
Derivative Action: A View From the Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 399 (1986) (discussing
derivative litigation from the standpoint of a practitioner in Portland, Maine or Portland, Oregon).
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C. Hypotheses to Be Tested
The propositions to be verified are of two types: Those propositions
which assume that Delaware corporate law is indeterminate, and those
propositions which are corollary to the major thesis that Delaware law
is indeterminate. Upon reflection, only the fourth proposition is of the
second type, and the first three propositions seem to be of the first
type. The propositions are described below.
First, the Delaware Proshareholder Hypothesis contends that, in
shareholder litigation, shareholder interests prevail much more fre-
quently than either critics or supporters of Delaware's corporate state
would imagine.
Second, the Proshareholder Hypothesis in Procedural Cases asserts
that shareholder interests achieve an inordinate rate of success in pro-
cedural cases primarily because the procedural incidents so created fa-
cilitate the bringing of corporate litigation in Delaware. 8
Third, the Roadmap Hypothesis holds that when shareholder inter-
ests do prevail on substantive issues, the Delaware Supreme Court out-
lines for the corporate bar a roadmap, either as appeasement to the
special interest group perceived to have been affected adversely, such as
corporate managements, the corporate bar, or even the Delaware legis-
lature, or as a means to aid others in avoiding the problem litigated, or
both.8"
Fourth, the Shareholder Victory Regularity Hypothesis maintains
that in Delaware, shareholder interests prevail with clocklike regularity.
Shareholder victories seem evenly spaced among the corporate law deci-
sions of the Delaware court and through time.
D. Possible Results
1. The Delaware Proshareholder Hypothesis. The frequency at
which shareholder interests prevail stands out, especially against the
background of what Professor Cary, Ralph Nader and others have writ-
ten about Delaware law and Delaware courts. In sixty-six Delaware Su-
preme Court cases from 1974 to 1987, two involved no clear winners or
losers, twenty-nine were victories for management interests, and thirty-
85. This point is not surprising and has been made many times before. See, e.g., Cary, supra
note 9, at 686-88; Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 510-13. The proposition is well illustrated by
the Delaware sequestration rule's fortunes and subsequent history. See supra note 28.
86. This proposition might shed light upon Justice Moore's cryptic remark in a later oral
argument about Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), that "there will never be another
Van Gorkom." See Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 519 n.194. Although the court held directors
liable for failure to comply with their duty of care in selling the company, the opinion is so much a
roadmap as to how directors should sell or approve the sale of a company that an analogous case
should not arise, at least until the opinion becomes shrouded in the mists of time.
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five seemed to be clear wins for shareholders. 7 Shareholder interests
thus prevailed nearly fifty-five percent of the time. These results may
be no great surprise to those who have studied the litigation process.88
The result would surprise those who have written that in Delaware
courts the dice are loaded in favor of corporate managements, or that in
Delaware the courts have a great deal of common sense and quite prop-
erly are promanagement in their decisionmaking.
2. The Proshareholder Hypothesis in Procedural Cases. In proce-
dural cases the results are much more dramatic. Of eighteen cases de-
nominated procedural, shareholder interests prevailed in fifteen of
them, an eighty-three percent victory rate. 9 Clearly this hypothesis has
a high degree of validity. Along with the Delaware legislature, Delaware
courts want plaintiffs to sue in Delaware, primarily because litigation
volume in Delaware fits in handsomely with the interests of a large seg-
ment of the Delaware corporate bar. Commentators, however, have
been illustrating that observation for years.9 0 This subset of eighteen
cases merely confirms that observation in more definitive fashion.
3. The Roadmap Hypothesis. For plaintiffs to sue, or to continue to
sue, in a specific forum, a favorable procedural environment alone may
not suffice. Some more than de minimus prospect of victory on the mer-
its also seems necessary.
Of the sixty-six case sample, forty-six cases remain after removing
the two cases in which no clear winner was apparent and the eighteen
cases termed procedural. In this subset, shareholder interests prevailed
on twenty occasions; management interests prevailed in the remain-
der. 1 Thus, on substantive corporate law issues the shareholders' suc-
cess rate drops but not drastically. Shareholders prevail 43.5 percent of
the time.
In roughly half of those cases in which shareholder interests prevail
on a substantive issue, as a consolation prize, or for other reasons, the
Delaware Supreme Court draws a roadmap for corporate managers and
those who advise them.9 2 In recent years this trend certainly has held
steady. Of twelve cases since 1980 denominated substantive and in
which shareholder interests have prevailed, exactly half are roadmap
87. See app. Table A, col. F.
88. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984) (discussing the relationship between litigated disputes and disputes settled before or during
litigation).
89. See app. Table A, cols. E, F.
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
91. See app. Table A, cols. E, F.
92. Eleven of twenty substantive decisions for shareholders have been denominated roadmap
cases. See app. Table A, cols. E-G.
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cases.93 These roadmap cases provide rich fodder for corporate law com-
mentators of all stripes.94 With the bounty of material these cases and
their roadmaps provide, the law review articles easily outnumber the
cases themselves, by a factor of twenty or more to one.
4. The Shareholder Victory Regularity Hypothesis. In every year
since 1976,11 except 1984,96 the Delaware justices have decided one or
more cases for shareholder interests. In every one of those years, save
1980, the court rendered a major substantive law decision in favor of
shareholder interests. In 1980 shareholder interests prevailed in four of
six cases, but all four involved procedural issues.9 7 Shareholder interests
have done exceedingly well in some time periods. In 1976 and 1982,
these interests prevailed in every case in which they appeared in
Delaware.9 8
A more representative year for shareholder interests was probably
1985. Of eleven corporate law opinions rendered that year, the Delaware
Supreme Court decided six for shareholder interests. Moreover, five of
the cases were substantive corporate law cases and at least two, Smith
v. Van Gorkom99 and Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.,100 were
major decisions. On the other hand, the 1985 cases decided in favor of
management interests were all substantive and could be described as
major.
01
Shareholder interests have had some somewhat drier spells. Two
occurred in the mid-1970s. Between the Delaware Supreme Court's de-
93. See app. Table A, col. G. The names of most of these cases have become part of every
corporate lawyer's lexicon-Zapata v. Maldonado, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., and Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings.
94. For example, on Smith v. Van Gorkom, compare Burgman & Cox, Corporate Directors,
Corporate Realities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CORP. L.
311 (1986) with Fischel, supra note 23 and Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of
Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986). See generally Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985).
95. There were no corporate law opinions released in 1978. See app. Table A at p. 116; see
also id. Table B (giving an annual compilation).
96. In 1984 the shareholder side in litigation lost all five decisions before the Delaware Su-
preme Court. See id. Table A at pp. 119-20.
97. Those cases were two attorney fee approvals, one class action settlement approval, and
one affirmation of the constitutionality of the director consent statute. See id. Table A at p. 117.
98. It should be pointed out that corporate law litigation with shareholder interests and
management interests in opposition to one another arose only four times in 1976 and three times
in 1982. Numbers of cases per year, wins for shareholder interests, and those wins as a percentage
of the yearly total of cases were extracted from Table A and are presented in a single page format
as Table B.
99. 458 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
100. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
101. They were Kaplan v. Wyatt, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., and Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co. See app. Table A at pp. 120-21.
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cision for shareholder interests in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.'0 2 and
Roland International Corp. v. Najjar,103 almost two years elapsed. In
the interim, however, only three corporate law decisions were handed
down and two of those were approvals of settlements, in other words
procedural cases favorable to shareholder interests.104
Similarly, nearly two years elapsed between the court's decision for
shareholder interests in Roland International Corp.0 5 and its next sub-
stantive law decision for shareholder interests, Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp. (Vickers I1).106 In the interim the court released opinions in nine
corporate law cases, but all were not decided for management interests.
Four of the opinions report procedural decisions that on balance favor
shareholder interests, including two attorney fee award approvals, 07 an
approval of settlement in a class action,0 8 and a finding that the Dela-
ware director consent statute was constitutional.' 9
In fourteen years the single truly dry spell for shareholder interests
came in the mid-1980s. From the court's decision in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc."0 until its proshareholder decision in Saxon Industries v.
NKFW Partners'" over two years passed. In this interval management
interests prevailed in eight of ten cases, many involving important sub-
stantive issues."2 Shareholder interests prevailed in only two cases,
both routine settlement approvals benefiting shareholders. 1 3
The 1983-1985 dry spell was followed, however, by a fertile period
for shareholder interests. As shown, shareholder interests prevailed in
five of eleven cases in 1985."
Examination of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinions over four-
teen years may not show a metronomic regularity to its decisions in
favor of shareholder interests. Examination of these opinions' timing
102. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
103. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
104. These two cases were Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97 (Del. 1979), and
Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932 (Del. 1979).
105. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
106. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
107. Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Baron, 413 A.2d 876 (Del. 1980).
108. Fins v. Pearlman, 424 A.2d 305 (Del. 1980).
109. Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980). For a listing of the four preceding
cases, see app. Table A at p. 117.
110. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
111. 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 1984).
112. See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (same); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984) (demand excused exception for derivative actions narrowly applied); see
also app. Table A at pp. 119-20.
113. Wied v. Valhi, Inc., 466 A.2d 9 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Geller v.
Tabas, 462 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1983).
114. See app. Table A at pp. 120-21; see also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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does indicate a regularity to the timing of decisions favoring share-
holder rather than management interests. This regularity confirms a
subjective impression felt by some, and with which other Delaware
court watchers informally have agreed. This regularity also may be cir-
cumstantial evidence of a certain amount of indeterminacy in Delaware
corporate law.
V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SURPRISING NUMBER OF
PROSHAREHOLDER DECISIONS IN INDETERMINACY'S WAKE
A. A Crossed Fingers View of Delaware Judges
In a famous dictum, Judge Jerome Frank postulated that seeking
to explain law's course may consist of no more than an effort to deter-
mine what judges have had for breakfast.115 A variation of that cynical
proposition is that judges decide cases with fingers crossed behind their
backs. They let the public think and, in their pronouncements, pretend
that law develops in a consistent manner and is firm stuff, even etched
in stone. Meanwhile the fingers crossed represent their true beliefs and
our judicial state of affairs. Judges know that they can decide cases any
way they want and that they easily enough can evade any precedent or
prior decision."'
Applying this crossed fingers view to the Delaware Supreme Court,
its justices periodically decide cases for shareholders because they favor
the underdog on certain days, or even out of flights of whim or fancy.
With tools of indeterminacy such as the Delaware equal dignity rule
and the Schnell doctrine available to them, Delaware judges certainly
have some ability to decide cases in whatever way they wish.
Entire volumes have been written to explain the institutional or
other forces that constrain judges and prevent them from utilizing the
full breadth of their ability to decide cases in almost any way they see
fit.1 7 Analyzing or even replicating those volumes is beyond the scope
of a single law review article, but judges, including Delaware judges, are
constrained in the exercise of any theoretically unfettered discretion
they may have to decide cases in any way they desire.
B. Individual Rather Than Institutional Factors at Work
Over the fourteen year period of study, only ten justices served on
the Delaware Supreme Court. For twelve of those years only eight indi-
115. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 161-62 (1949) (describing gastronomical jurisprudence).
116. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 36-41 (1986) (contrasting the public's frequent con-
ception of law as a plain fact with a "fingers crossed" jurisprudence).
117. See, e.g., id.
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viduals sat on the five judge court.11 The surprisingly proshareholder
content of Delaware decisions could be explained by the happenstance
that during this period a high percentage of that relatively small num-
ber of individuals favored underdogs, espoused populism in their corpo-
rate philosophies, or otherwise held a more proshareholder outlook than
the justices in any other period.
C. Directly Conflicting Lines of Decision and a Roughly Equal
Distribution of Outcomes Are Merely the Products of Any Well-
Developed System of Appellate Jurisprudence
"There are places in the law through which a pair of mutually ob-
livious doctrines run in infinitely parallel contrariety, like a pair of
poolhall scoring racks on one or the other of which, seemingly at ran-
dom, cases get hung up."'119 In Delaware the seeming diametrically op-
posed equal dignity rule cases and Schnell along with its progeny are
but another example of the poolhall scoring rack phenomenon.
A slightly perverse theory goes further. The theory holds that the
more opinions a high court renders in a given area the more indetermi-
nate, rather than predictable, the law becomes. This counterintuitive
notion gathers support from fourth amendment search and seizure
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. Every time the
Court renders a new decision the Court introduces yet more uncer-
tainty. To enhance predictability, appellate courts ought to cease writ-
ing opinions in areas of law that become well trafficked." '2 The
118. See 316 A.2d V (showing the composition of the Delaware Supreme Court). From 1974
until 1987, Daniel L. Herrman, James B. Cary, William Duffy, John J. McNeilly, William T. Quil-
len, Henry R. Horsey, Andrew G. T. Moore, H, and Andrew G. Christie served as justices. In 1987
Joseph T. Walsh and Randy J. Holland were added to the court, replacing the long serving Chief
Justice Herrman and Associate Justice McNeilly on the five member panel. Part of the explana-
tion for having so few justices is that the Delaware Supreme Court had only three seats until 1979.
In 1979 the court expanded to five seats, although the usual panel remains three justices.
119. Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67,
67 (1960) (footnote omitted). Or as the legal realist Karl Llewellyn stated:
What I wish to sink deep into your minds about the doctrine of precedent ... is that it
is two-headed. It is Janus-faced. That it is not one doctrine, nor one line of doctrine, but two,
and two which, applied at the same time to the same precedent, are contradictory of each
other.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
120. See, e.g., Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1,
2 & n.5 (stating that "there is an uncertainty principle at work in the judicial process: any attempt
to achieve certainty regarding any important constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and-even
if it does succeed in the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty as to more issues than it
settles," and applying the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle from the science of nuclear physics).
Other examples used to illustrate the phenomenon are the Court's attempt to define obscenity and
to define commercial speech in first amendment contexts. See, e.g., id. at 17-27 (discussing this
phenomenon in obscenity and commercial speech cases). In Delaware the example that comes to
mind is the Delaware Supreme Court's ongoing attempt to define the conditions under which a
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indeterminacy in Delaware corporate law is no different than other ar-
eas of appellate jurisprudence in which courts must decide a high vol-
ume of cases within a particular substantive area's relatively narrow
confines.
The distribution of outcomes between shareholder and manage-
ment interests is also the product of a volume of cases. Lopsided cases,
those in which the merits heavily favor one side over the other, tend not
to survive the pretrial discovery stage, let alone trial or appellate review
by a state's highest court. Hence, when the volume of decided cases in
any particular area becomes robust, as it is in Delaware in the corporate
law area, the distribution of outcomes between plaintiffs and defend-
ants, or shareholders and managers, should begin to tend toward a bal-
anced distribution."2 In the sample of sixty-six decisions over fourteen
years, shareholder interests prevailed nearly fifty-five percent of the
time.'22 In cases denominated as substantive corporate law cases, share-
holder interests prevailed just under forty-four percent of the time. 23
These distributions between shareholder and management outcomes
are nothing more than products of the natural winnowing process that
eliminates lopsided cases long before they reach the appellate level. 24
majority shareholder may legitimately squeeze out the remaining minority. Each new decision
seems to raise as many questions as it answers. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
121. See Priest & Klein, supra note 88, at 4-5. The authors concluded:
Our model . . . demonstrates that, where the gains or losses from litigation are equal to the
parties, the individual maximizing decisions of the parties will create a strong bias toward a
rate of success for plaintiffs at trial or appellants at appeal of 50 percent regardless of the
substantive standard of law. Thus, plaintiff victories will tend toward 50 percent whether the
legal standard is negligence or strict liability, whether judges or juries are hostile or
sympathetic.
Id. (footnote omitted). Derivative and other forms of corporate litigation seem to fit better this
model than instances in which potential gains or losses to the parties are asymmetrical, though
corporate litigation seemingly would not fit either extreme perfectly. Examples of asymmetry in-
clude cases of a firm accused "of manufacturing a blatantly defective product (as Ford was accused
with respect to the Pinto) [in which the firm] may face a substantial loss in future sales if a jury
returns an adverse civil liability verdict," and cases in which "an adverse antitrust judgment may
require a defendant firm to change an existing sales practice or marketing technique and so in-
crease its costs." Id. at 25.
122. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
124. From 1972 until 1985 the United States Supreme Court decided a large number of cor-
porate-securities law cases. In every case save one or two, the Court decided in defendants' favor.
In many of the cases, the Court used the occasion to curb the law's reach. See, e.g., Branson,
Statutory Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of Modes of
Flexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L. REv. 50, 74, n.98 (1977) (reviewing 13 of 14 consecutive securities law
decisions for defendants from 1972 until 1977); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Nothing remotely resembling an equal distribution of outcomes
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D. The Delaware Supreme Court's Surprisingly Proshareholder
Output Accords with an Unexplored Side of Interest Group Analysis
Simply put, the interest group analysis has to have a shareholder,
or plaintiffs', or more accurately, a plaintiffs' bar side to the equation.
That side has been largely neglected. Indeed, not all the interest groups
have been adequately identified. In addition to corporate managers and
the local counsel of corporations themselves, the Delaware state trea-
sury, the corporation service companies, and the office lawyer and de-
fense counsel components of the Delaware corporate bar, another
interest group can be identified as those attorneys who on a more or
less consistent basis represent shareholder interests.
Delaware must have plaintiffs suing in its courts to deliver the vol-
ume of appellate guidance and supposed predictability that therefore
will ensue. As shown, Delaware makes it easy for shareholders to bring
suit in its courts.12 5 The promise of relatively uncritical appraisal of
plaintiff attorney fee awards and other aspects of settlements' 6 also
lures shareholder litigation to Delaware. Yet over time no plaintiffs'
counsel could continuously bring suit in Delaware if little or no pros-
pect of victory on the merits existed. An exceptionally venal lawyer
could survive for a time bringing suit in a forum in which little or no
chance of victory existed. Eventually, however, plaintiffs and the litiga-
tion would go elsewhere. Hence, Delaware substantive law must have a
wild card of greater substantive law element in favor of shareholder in-
terests. As displayed, Delaware law does.'
7
This necessity for some plaintiff or shareholders' side often is mis-
understood. One leading scholar maintains that Delaware's
proshareholder decisions "pose a threat to the continued primacy of
Delaware.' ' 128 On another occasion this scholar has castigated the Dela-
ware Supreme Court and its roadmap opinions in cases it decides for
shareholder interests as "bizarre" and "an antibusiness approach.'1 29
An apologist for dominance of management interests simply calls such
decisions in favor of shareholders "atrocious."' 30 Such critics fail to ap-
preciate all the interest groups involved and the delicate and sometimes
occurred. Appellate review in the United States Supreme Court, however, is discretionary in the
corporate-securities area. In that impressive string of cases for defendants, the Burger Court
seemed to select cases on the basis of their value in an overall effort to restrict the law's reach and
to teach lower federal courts restraint in application of the federal securities laws.
125. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
128. See Fischel, supra note 10, at 942.
129. Fischel, supra note 23, at 1454 & n.37.
130. Manning, supra note 94, at 1.
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perverse balancing among them that must take place for Delaware to
continue the production that has resulted in its continued primacy. An
explanation for Delaware's surprisingly proshareholder output of deci-
sions is that a not uninvisible hand operates to serve the special interest
groups that make up the Delaware establishment, including the share-
holder and plaintiffs' counsel side that this establishment must have.'
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the explanation for what has filled indeterminacy's wake
in Delaware corporate jurisprudence, a corporate lawyer's mind inevita-
bly turns to more practical ramifications of the theory. In fact, the inde-
terminacy thesis's value may be largely heuristic, incapable of proof but
helpful for understanding practical phenomenon about Delaware law.
One practical value of the theory's development is to expose the contra-
riety or indeterminacy inherent in the lines of cases on the equal dig-
nity rule and the Schnell doctrine. In particular, the literature treats
the latter as an isolated instance, failing to develop the substantial case
law that has explored the original Schnell doctrine's contours. This Ar-
ticle is a modest, beginning effort to do so.
A more important ramification of the theory might be to turn on its
head the traditional justification for incorporating or, especially, as a
publicly held company, reincorporating in Delaware. That justification
is that "[b]ecause of the many corporations domiciled in Delaware, the
Delaware judiciary has become particularly familiar with matters of
corporate law, and Delaware has an extensive body of court decisions
interpreting its corporate law, which serve as a reliable guide for corpo-
rate action.'1
32
Despite what has been said in this Article about pool hall scoring
racks and indeterminacy in Delaware law, that justification remains un-
deniably sound. The wealth of Delaware precedent enables corporate
counsel to construe the corporate statute, structure transactions, and
131. This hand does not operate without limits. If the Delaware Supreme Court operates too
freely in favor of shareholder or any other interests, the Delaware legislature can overrule the
offending court decision. Indeed, such a trump card was played after the court's proshareholder
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In that case, the court left open for
duty of care liability an experienced and capable board of directors who had decided to sell their
publicly held corporation. The potential liability ran into tens of millions of dollars for conduct
that experts deemed, if anything, only slightly negligent. Approximately 15 months later, the Dela-
ware legislature responded with a statute permitting corporations to amend articles of incorpora-
tion to opt out of liability for their directors for duty of care violations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
VIII, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). See generally Comment, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability:
Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
239 (1987).




predict probable outcomes should issues become the subject of litiga-
tion. Such prediction, however, is only accurate to a point. On levels
one, two, and three of interpretation, such certainty and predictability
exist to a great degree."'3 On what I would call level four, however,
where the stakes are quite large in litigated cases, indeterminacy oper-
ates to introduce a significant wild card element into Delaware corpo-
rate jurisprudence. That wild card element may not exist in the
corporation's home state where the judiciary has no highly recognizable
special interest groups, such as a corporate bar, and one markedly seg-
mented at that, to serve. In the major cases, the home state court would
be more likely to favor management, especially when other interest
group factors not particularly relevant to the Delaware equation, such
as jobs and the effect on local communities, loom large. And on levels
one, two, and three, because Delaware law is becoming our national cor-
porate law especially on technical and finer points of law, home state
courts undoubtedly can be persuaded to follow Delaware's lead. Based
upon the indeterminacy thesis about Delaware corporation law, the best
advice to some chief executive officers and boards of directors of pub-
licly held firms may be to stay at home.3
Legal realism and the indeterminacy thesis of CLS scholars explain
much about Delaware's dominance in the corporate field. Application of
these theses to corporate law also leads perhaps to some surprising,
counterintuitive results. There seems to be far more room for share-
holder interests to prevail in cases litigated in Delaware than is com-
monly thought to be the case. From the corporate viewpoint, the
traditional wisdom, that at some point in a publicly held firm's matura-
tion a serious look should be taken at reincorporation in Delaware, may
not hold, in part because the special interest group array in Delaware
has, and must have, a plaintiff-shareholder side.
133. Across the spectrum of areas of law, CLS scholars agree. Despite their indeterminacy
thesis about law in general, "at the level of practice, lawyers can often predict what decision a
judge will make or what argument their colleagues will find most convincing." Stick, Book Review,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 412 (1988) (reviewing M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987)).
134. Martin Lipton recently has agreed. Cohen, Lipton Tells Clients That Delaware May
Not Be a Place to Incorporate, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1988, at B7, col. 1 (preferring Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and New Jersey); accord Labaton, The "Poison Pill" Takes a Beating, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1988, at D2, col. 1 (action by Delaware courts has been inimical to adoption of takeover defenses
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